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ABSTRACT 
The Process failure that occurred at Buncefield site, Hertfordshire, UK was one of the landmark 
incidents in the process safety concerns of vapor cloud explosion. The vapor cloud that formed 
was due to overfilled large storage tank, containing unleaded fuel. The overflow of the tank was 
the result of a failed level indicating system and lack of operator‟s attention at the site. A legal 
investigation on the incident was carried out by Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 
(BMIIB), which presented the causes for the explosion and the recommendations for future 
prevention. The report briefly discusses the series of steps that led to the major incident. Prior to 
the Buncefield, a massive explosion on such scale was not predicted; hence the Buncefield 
incident breaches the worst case scenario that was predicted for vapor cloud explosion. The 
report also provides the explanation regarding why the explosion breaches the worst case 
scenario for predicted strength of the vapor cloud explosion. Moreover similar accidents are also 
presented along with the recommendations presented by Buncefield Major Incident 
Investigation Board. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The largest fire Europe has known since World War II occurred at the Hertfordshire Oil 
Storage Terminal, an oil storage facility located by Hemel Hempstead in Hertfordshire, England 
on 11 December 2005. The Oil Storage Terminal, with a capacity of 60,000,000 imperial gallons 
of fuel, was the fifth largest oil-products storage depot in the United Kingdom. It was co-owned 
by two companies; TOTAL and Texaco. Three other companies were also involved in the 
disaster, notoriously known as the Buncefield disaster
.1
 
Like most damaging explosions, the Buncefield disaster consisted of a series of 
explosions; the first of which led to further explosions eventually shattered twenty large storage 
tanks. Investigations determined that a flammable cloud formed by overfilling and spillage of 
300 tonnes of petrol by a storage tank which has been ignited resulting in explosion. 
Interestingly, what added to the intensity of the explosion was the presence of trees, which 
resulted in a larger overpressures producing severe property damage.
2
 
The impacts resulting from the accident resulted in significant health, economic, and 
environmental damages. Even though the damage resulting from the accident has been 
exorbitant, and the fire burned for several days, not a single fatality was involved with the 
disaster. Unfortunately however, over forty people were injured.
3
 In financial terms, these 
impacts cost the companies approximately nine million, and five hundred thousand Euros. The 
claimants included businesses, individuals, and local authorities. Although most of the claims 
were from individuals, the most costly ones were from the business organizations. As for the 
environmental impacts, this accident led to both air and ground pollution. 
 The severe impacts led to the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (BMIIB) to 
investigate and record their recommendations to avoid such incidents from occurring in the 
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future. Even with that, two similar accidents occurred not too long after Buncefield‟s: One in 
Puerto Rico, and the other in India.  
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THE BUNCEFIELD INCIDENT 
Accident Site and Key Events 
The Buncefield Depot 
 The Buncefield depot was opened over thirty years ago, in 1968, outside the town of 
Hemel Hempstead which was located approximately forty kilometers away from London, and 
close to the busy M1 motorway. Figure 1 below shows a map locating the Buncefield fuel depot 
in England. 
3
 This 50-acre fuel depot was the fifth largest storage site in England. 
4
 
Approximately eight percent of United Kingdom‟s overall oil supplies, out of which twenty 
percent was consumed by southeast United Kingdom, were provided by the depot.
 5 
Buncefield 
depot used to store the fuels in large tanks before being transported to different refineries such as 
petrol stations and airports.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Buncefield fuel depot, England 
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The Depot’s sites 
The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, also known as HOSL, delivered approximately 
2.37 million metric tons of oil products a year by pipeline and tankers. This oil consisted of 
mainly petrol, diesel, and aviation fuels. 
3
 HOSL was a joint venture between Total and 
Chevron, and its east and west units made up forty percent of Buncefield.
5
 There were two other 
sits in the depot: British Pipeline Agency Ltd (BPA), a joint venture between Shell and BP with 
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UK Oil Pipeline Ltd. and BP Oil Ltd, located south of the depot. Each site was allowed to store 
70,000 and 75,000 of fuels respectively.
4
 
Buncefield’s Pipelines 
Three different pipelines were extended from Buncefield depot to supply numerous 
refineries in the U.K.: Finaline, M/B pipeline, and T/K pipeline. 
4
 As a matter of fact, Buncefield 
supplied London Gatwick Airport, the second largest airport in the United Kingdom. Also one 
of the pipelines was specifically designed to supply approximately forty percent of the aviation 
fuel used at London Heathrow Airport, 
5
 U.K.‟s first, and the world‟s third most active airport. 6 
The Incident 
 On Saturday 10 December 2005, petrol was being delivered through Buncefield‟s T/K 
pipeline to a tank, Tank 912 in bund A (Figure 2) 
4
, in the northwest corner of the site. 
4
 Usually, 
the gauges shown in Figure 3 take fuel level readings in the tank as it is being filled from a 
pipeline. In case the tank reaches its maximum volume limit, an automatic high level safety 
switch would activate an alarm, which then results in a system shutdown. Unfortunately, the 
safety system was not working at the time, and none of the workers realized that the filling has 
exceeded the tank‟s capacity. This resulted in fuel overflow through the roof vents.  
Investigators believe that the overflow occurred at around 5:20 am. 
3
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: How the vapor spread at Buncefield 
3
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Figure 3: Tank 912
 3
 
 The overflow resulted in a formation of a vapor cloud rich in fuel and air at around 5:38 
am. CCTV (Closed-circuit television) footages show the formation of a white misty cloud 
formation. (Figure 4) 
4
. Although the exact composition and nature of the cloud is not known 
with full accuracy, investigators assumed that it might have been a volatile fraction of the 
original fuel, or ice formations that resulted from the chilled air as a result of the escaping fuel‟s 
evaporation.
 4
 
 This cloud was initially approximately one meter deep; however it thickened until it 
reached around two meters, and started dispersing in different directions. Twelve minutes later, 
the vapor started drifting off near the site, close to the intersection of Cherry Tree Lane and 
Buncefield Lane. At 5:50 am, the rate of the fuel pumping into tank 912 was around 550 cubic 
meters per hour. In the next ten minutes, the rate increased to approximately 890 cubic meters 
per hour. 
3
 Normally, petrol does not explode easily, however over three hundred tonnes of 
petrol were released from the tank, out of which approximately ten percent turned to vapor that 
mixed with air. This resulted in the formation of a flammable mixture, or a vapor cloud with 
concentrations that are high enough to combust.
 5 
At 6:01 am, the vapor cloud blanketed a large 
area and reached the buildings next to the site where the first explosion occurred. 
3
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Figure 4: Images from a CCTV footage
 4
 
 The first massive explosion lead to further explosions, causing a massive fire that 
submerged more than twenty large storage tanks over a large section of the Buncefield depot. 
After five days of the fire burning, most of the depot was destroyed. The evidence could be seen 
from many miles away, and in satellite images, as an outsized plume of black smoke, which 
after some time spread over southern England and beyond. 
4
 
 A major emergency was announced by the emergency services at around 06:08 am, and a 
firefighting effort began. Twenty five fire engines, twenty support cars, and around one hundred 
and eighty firefighters were on the site before the flames were put down on the fifteenth of 
December. 
3
 Around one thousand firefighters were involved in putting down the flame. It took 
thirty-two hours to extinguish the main fire, although a few smaller tanks were still ablaze on 
Tuesday the thirteenth of December. A new fire began on the following day in an intact tank, but 
the emergency service let allowed it to burn out safely. The firefighting maneuver utilized 
approximately 750,000 liters of foam concentrate, and 55 million liters of water. Also, over two 
thousand people  had to evacuate their houses during the emergency operation, and some of the 
10 
 
motorway sections had to be closed. A few schools in Hertforshire, Buckinghamshire, and 
Bedfordshire were shut down for two days after the explosion.
3
 
 After putting out all the fire on the fifteenth of December, a specialist investigation team 
from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environmental Agency were given the task 
of analyzing what had caused the accident in the first place. A few days later, some of the 
damaged areas on and around the site were cleaned up. However, some sections of the site were 
still too dangerous for the investigators to access them for days, weeks, and sometimes months 
afterwards. 
3
 
What Makes This Explosion Unusual? 
 What made the main explosion unusual amongst other vapor cloud explosions is the high 
overpressure that was associated with it. 
4
 The third of three progress reports from the BMIIB 
states that “The magnitude of the overpressures generated in the open areas of the Northgate and 
Fuji car parks is not consistent with the current understanding of the vapor cloud explosions”. At 
this point, Gexcon‟s investigation with Total helped in finding the mechanisms underlying the  
severe Buncefield explosion. 
7
 
 High Overpressure 
  “As a definition, the term overpressure refers to the pressure increase in the vessel over 
the set pressure during the relieving process. It is equivalent to the accumulation when the set 
pressure is at the maximum allowable working pressure, or the maximum gauge pressure 
allowed at the top of a vessel for a certain temperature. 
8
 In simple terms, it is the transient air 
pressure that is greater than the surrounding atmospheric pressure. 
9
  
 The question remains as to what caused this overpressure? Initially, Gexcon performed a 
survey on the remnants of the Buncefield oil storage depot in June 2006. From this survey, it 
11 
 
was found that the congestion that was present in the tank fire was not adequate enough to cause 
the high overpressure that had occurred. However, when the area of the Buncefield accident was 
examined, it lead to the theory that the trees and the undergrowth along two roads enclosing the 
site formed the significant congestion that was responsible for the flame‟s acceleration and 
therefore the high overpressures in the flammable cloud 
7.
 
   
 
 
 
 
In order to further support their theory, Gexcon modeled the oil depot and the 
surrounding suspect tree areas using FLACS, the explosion and dispersion simulator. 
Simulations of the explosions of the large vapor cloud performed showed that when the trees 
were incorporated into the model, a very high overpressure was generated. In some cases, the 
overpressure exceeded 10 bars, a value large enough to explain the damage caused. However, 
when the simulation was repeated without trees, a very low overpressure was obtained; 
sometimes below 0.1 bar.
7
 
Unfortunately, since the size, location, and composition of the vapor cloud were not 
obtainable, the simulation of the true representation of the actual explosion that took place was 
prevented. However, when the code was applied to the Buncefield case it produced realistic 
results. Although this is not proof enough to state that the trees were the sole reason for the high 
overpressures, work presented in 2009 by the Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) 
Figure 5: Undergrowth and Trees Surrounding the Site
7
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supported Gexcon‟s conclusion that the trees played a vital role in developing Buncefield‟s 
explosion.
7
 
IMPACTS OF THE ACCIDENT 
The Buncefield Incident had many impacts which cost the company £1 billion. This 
money was spent on three areas: Economical, environmental and health-related damages.
4
 
Financial impacts 
Economically there were three major impacts. The first one was the cost of the incident 
itself. The total cost of the incident was estimated to be approximately £1 billion. More details 
on the cost are shown in table 1 below. 
4
 
Table 1: Overall cost of the UK incident 
Sector Cost (£ million) 
Site operators (compensation claims) £625 
 
Aviation £245 
Competent Authority and Government 
response 
£15 
Emergency response  £7 
Environmental impact (drinking water) £2 
Total £894 
  
From Table 1, it is shown that out of the five different sectors, the most costly one was 
regarding the site operators. Table 2 includes more details regarding the costs of the business, 
individuals, and the local authorities that were involved in the accident. These include claims 
directed from individuals who were evacuated from their houses during the fire, and the 
damages that were pertained to the damages inflicted as a result of the explosion. 
4
 Those 
damages were mostly broken windows, door frames, roofs and cracks in walls. Fortunately, with 
these minor damages did not cause the house prices to decrease. While some of the individuals 
13 
 
were fortunate enough to be far from the accident site, some of them residing nearby suffered 
major structural damages. Some people got their claim from their insurance companies, while 
others still did not receive them.
10
 The total amount of money presented in Table 2 below does 
not include the price of rebuilding the incident site. 
4
 
Table 2: Business, individuals and local authorities cost. 
Type  Number  Cost  Million (£) 
 
Business 
 
  
 inside site perimeter 5 103£ 
 outside site perimeter 749 188£ 
 Subtotal businesses   754 591£ 
Individuals   3379 30£ 
Local authorities 7 4£ 
Total 4140 625£ 
 
Although most of the claims were from individuals, the most costly claims were from the 
business organizations. Approximately fourteen businesses were relocated, and several others 
started operating from temporary sites.  Also, two businesses have gone into bankruptcy.  Those 
number of businesses amounted to 630 firms, 90 of which are companies with 16,500 
employees. The cost of the people losing their jobs was estimated to be £10 million. 
4
 
Not only did the accident affect the buildings surrounding the site, but another major part 
of the community was affected: the Heathrow Airport. The airport stopped working for a period 
of time because the Buncefield used to supply the airport with 21 million liters of fuel daily. As 
a result, the airport had to arrange for other delivery method to refuel the planes; long flights 
stopped at other nearby airports, whereas the short flights refueled their planes before flying to 
Heathrow. 
4
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Environmental Cost 
 The environmental impacts caused pollution damage. These were  categorized into two major 
types: air and ground pollution. No sufficient details can be found regarding the exact figures 
involved with the air pollution. The ground pollution, on the other hand, cost £2 million. 
4
 
Approximately twenty six million liters of water were used to fight the fire. The water 
that was used to fight the fire was then stored. Unfortunately, eighty thousand liters of this 
stored water was found to have leaked into a tributary of the river Thames. This water contained 
toxic materials that do not decompose in the ground. In order to avoid more contamination, the 
£2 million were used to treat the water and make sure that it does not contain any toxic 
materials. 
10
 
Personal injuries 
Although there were no deaths, there were forty-three injuries reported. Those injuries 
were minor, and not life threatening.  
4
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SIMILAR INCIDENTS 
After such a massive accident, one would think that people would learn from their 
mistakes. Unfortunately, this did not happen. More than one Buncefield-like accident occurred 
after this massive catastrophe. In the paragraphs that follow, two incidents will be summarized. 
One occurred in Puerto Rico, and the other in India.  
 In October 23, 2009 a massive explosion and fire occurred in Puerto Rico near San Juan. 
More than half of the fuel depot‟s tanks (forty tanks) were burned. The fire lasted three days and 
many businesses and houses were burned. The incident was also a result of overfilling of a tank, 
which did not even have a monitoring system. As the gasoline started to spill from the tank, it 
vaporized and formed a vapor cloud approximately 2000 feet (610 meter) above the ground. The 
flammable vapor cloud ignited as soon as it got in contact with an unknown ignition source.
13
 
Luckily enough, no one died as a result of this incident (only one person was taken to the 
hospital and 350 people were evacuated). The incident cost $6.4 million.
14
 From the information 
presented, this accident was caused by the same reasons that led to the UK incident, and it can 
be clearly seen that the industry people did not apply the recommendations presented from the  
Buncefield fire.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Buncefield fire in Puerto Rico. 
14
 
16 
 
The other similar incident occurred in Jaipur, India, where the fire lasted for eleven days.  
Although the accident was also a result of tank overfilling, it was more careless than the 
previous ones as the workers bluntly overlooked all the signs of a hazard occurring. Reports 
reveal that alarms started and the smell of oil was detected, but the workers chose to withhold 
this information from the officials until it became out of anyone‟s control. 11 Eleven tanks were 
burned out, and five workers died at the work site and many other were transferred to the 
hospital. 
12
  
 
Figure 7: Buncefield in Jaipur, India.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The BMIIB provided a detailed analysis of the Buncefield accident, as well as a report 
containing recommendations in order to improve the safety in the design and operation of fuel 
storage sites. The commission came up with many recommendations. These were classified 
under three main categories, and will be elaborated upon in the following sections.   
 
1. Recommendations on land use planning and the control of societal risk around 
Buncefield. 
2. Recommendations on emergency preparedness and response to and recovery from the 
incident 
3. Recommendation on the design and operation of fuel storage sites 
 
Land use planning and the control of societal risk around Buncefield 
 
Land use planning includes the location of on-site and off-site developments. This 
involves engaging the technical panel to derive risk zone contours. The planning authorities take 
decisions on planning by taking into account the interests of the local community, the developer 
and relevant safety and environmental considerations. The advice from BMIIB includes the 
developments within the consultation distance of major hazard sites
16
. 
 
Societal risk is a measure of hazards that might affect people. It takes into account the total 
population at a potential risk. Even in areas where the individual risk is low, societal risk can 
still have significant impacts that cause it to be the main driver for risk reduction measures. 
Buncefield incident was fortunate to have no fatalities; however there was intense public 
18 
 
reaction due to the extreme damages that were caused.  The key recommendations on the land 
use planning and control of societal risk include the following
16
: 
 Improvements in defining major hazard scenarios at flammable storage sites 
 Improving the recording and sharing of incident data  
 Improvements in investigating root causes of the incidents  
 
The primary method of determining the human hazards was measured by the „dangerous 
dose or worse‟ assessment. In this risk assessment, the hazard criteria are defined in terms of a 
dangerous dose of toxic, or heat, or explosion overpressure
16
. As a definition, the dangerous 
dose is one which gives rise to one or more of the following effects
22
: 
 
A. Severe distress to almost everyone 
 
B. A substantial fraction requires medical attention 
 
C. Some people are seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment 
 
D. Highly susceptible people might be killed 
 
 
This form of risk assessment was a weak link to determine individual risk.  Hence a new  
 
method of risk evaluation was proposed based on „risk of fatality‟. Risk of fatality is based on   
 
annual probability that a fatality might occur
16
.  
 
Emergency Preparedness and Response to and Recovery from the Incident 
This section mainly highlights recommendation on the operations as a response to the 
incident , and the location of the recovery equipment. After the explosion had occurred, the two 
pump houses and their associated lagoons to the north and northwest of the site were rendered 
unavailable for use as it was blocked by the explosion. This could have been prevented by 
relocating the pump houses to a safer and more accessible location. Alternative arrangements 
must also be present in case primary response facilities become unavailable
21
.  
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Other ways in which the response to the incident could be improved is the introduction 
of an alternative passage through which the crew members could be evacuated and additional 
support in terms of fire fighting
21
.  
In addition to the mentioned recommendations, seasonal variations must also be taken 
into account. For example, the main water source for fighting the fires at Buncefield was the 
Breakspear Lagoon, which may not have held sufficient water during summer. Hence ensuring 
the proper water level in the tank is one of the important issues in the emergency preparedness
21
. 
 
The Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites 
 
In brief the recommendation based on the design and the operation of fuel storage sites 
emphasize upon the need to increase the protection provided by primary containment systems. 
The primary means of containment were the tanks, pipes and vessels that hold liquids and the 
devices fitted to them, in case of an emergency to allow for safer operations until the issue is 
taken care of. The incident at Buncefield occurred due to the failure of the primary containment 
system, which allowed the overfilling of a vessel, resulting in the formation of large flammable 
vapor cloud that subsequently ignited
20
.  
The effective means of preventing environmental pollution in the event of a failure of 
primary containment must be covered by secondary and tertiary containment systems in order to 
operate within safety limits. The Secondary means of containment consist of enclosed areas 
around storage vessels (often called bunds), created usually by concrete or earth walls. Their 
purpose is to hold any escaping liquid or chemicals used in firefighting. Tertiary means are 
features such as drains designed to limit the passage of chemicals off the site, raised kerbs to 
prevent liquids that have breached the bunds from escaping into the general area around the site. 
Moreover safety equipment must be proof tested before implementation
20
. 
 
20 
 
Protecting against loss of primary containment using high integrity systems 
According to the commission, protection against loss of primary containment system could 
be dealt with by ensuring the integrity of the containment system. To ensure integrity, an 
independent overfill prevention systems must be installed at sites handling large quantities of 
highly flammable liquid
20
.  
Moreover, in the event of transferring the flammable liquid, proper communication must be 
done between the parties responsible of transferring the fuel between the sites and refineries. 
This mainly involves the communications between site operators and operators of pipeline 
transfers
20
.  
The other aspect on the protection against primary containment includes fitting of automatic 
operating overfill prevention that is physically and electrically separate and independent from 
the tank gauging system. Moreover, an arrangement must be made to ensure the receiving site 
has control of tank filling i.e. the receiving site should be able to safely terminate or divert a 
transfer (to prevent loss of containment or other dangerous conditions) without depending on the 
availability of communications with the remote location. Hence in case of emergencies, the time 
delay could be prevented by not relying on communications from the transferring sites
20
. The 
following Figure 8 shows the schematic diagram of a typical internal floating roof tank
19
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Diagram depicting the internal floating roof tank 
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According to the recommendation, the roof tank could be employed with an independent 
ultimate high level switch (upper right on figure 1). In the situation of power cutoff, the high 
level switch keeps functioning to monitor the safe level of the tank. The tank capacities fill 
levels and safety margins must also be clearly determined for all fuel storage tanks. To prevent 
an overflow, tanks should have headspace devices that enable the filling line to be closed off in 
time. The set points of high level trips and alarms should allow sufficient time for the action to 
be taken to deal with the developing situation
17
. 
Having established the overfill level (maximum capacity), it is then necessary to specify 
a level, below an alarm sounds and allow sufficient time to take safety measures. This is known 
as the „tank rated capacity‟17.  
The prevention of the secondary containment equipment failure could be achieved by the 
following procedures: 
 Detecting high levels of vapor in secondary containment is an early indication of loss of 
primary containment. This failure should initiate action to limit the extent of any further 
loss of material. This can be achieved using an overfill prevention system
20
. 
 Bunds should have no pipe work that penetrate through the bund floors or walls, they 
should also have sufficient capacity to allow for tank failure and firewater management, 
and they should be capable of withstanding the full hydrostatic head of liquid that may 
arise from the loss of primary containment
20
. 
 Installing CCTV equipment to assist operators with early detection of abnormal 
conditions. Operators cannot routinely monitor large numbers of passive screens, but 
equipment is available that detects and responds to changes in conditions and alerts 
operators to these changes
20
. 
Tertiary containment is independent of the primary and secondary containment systems. 
These include site drainage systems and sumps, diversion tanks, impervious liners and/or 
flexible booms. Tertiary containment will be utilized when there is an event that causes the loss 
22 
 
of primary and secondary containment (bund joint failure or firewater overflowing from a bund 
during a prolonged tank fire)
 19
. 
 
DAMAGE COST VERSUS COST WITH SAFETY EQUIPMENT 
The Board recommendations included several solutions to prevent a major incident like 
the Buncefeild. The basis for these calculations is that of a typical site operation containing ten 
tanks. Three solutions were evaluated: 
1.       The placement of an automatic shut-off valve in the inlet pipe to the site to prevent 
the fuel from flowing to all the tanks on the site. This solution‟s cost is estimated to 
be £23 million. 
2.  The placement of an automatic shut-off value in each pipe tank inlet to prevent fuel 
flow between tanks and from one tank to another. It can also be a solution to isolate  
the tank is case of a fire. This solution costs approximately £82 million. 
3.      The placement of two automatic valves in each tank; One in the inlet and another in 
the outlet to prevent the fuel from flowing between tanks. It will also isolate the tank 
in the case one of the valves‟ failure. This method costs around £167 million. 
As shown, the cheapest solution to prevent a major Buncefield-like accident costs £23 million. If 
compared to the total cost of the damage caused by the entire Buncefield accident (£1 billion), 
one can see how much money a company can save even if it incorporated the most expensive 
safety system.  
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CONCLUSION 
In December 11, 2005 a huge explosion occurred in Hertforeshire, England, the fifth 
largest oil-product storage in the United Kingdom. Although it began with one massive 
explosion, it resulted to a series of explosions that led to severe damages. The incident was 
initiated because of the overfilling and spillage of fuel in one of the tanks. This lead to the 
formation of a flammable cloud that was ignited by an unknown ignition source. What made this 
incident even worse was the large overpressure associated with it. Further studies and 
experimentations showed that this occurred due to the presence of trees. 
The accident resulted in economic, heath and environmental impacts. Many businesses 
suffered from damages that lead to their relocation, and others had to shut down.  This caused 
many people to lose their jobs. Although no one died in the accident, many people were injured 
and had to be transferred to the hospitals. Environmentally, some of the water that was used in 
the fire fighting operations was found to be leaking to a tributary of the Thames, causing ground 
pollution. As a result, the company started treating the stored water, costing them even more 
money. When the cost of the impacts were compared with the cost of incorporating safety 
equipment in the process, it was found that the cost of adding safety tools was a lot less than the 
cost resulting from the damage. This leads to the generalization that inherent safety will not only 
save time and effort, but money as well. 
These impacts led to a major investigation by the Buncefield Major Incident 
Investigation Board (BMIIB). The recommendations given by them were made to avoid the 
recurrence of similar accidents. Unfortunately, not many companies learned from these mistake. 
Two similar accidents occurred not too long after Buncefield‟s: One in Puerto Rico, and the 
other in India. 
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